INTRODUCTION
In the thirty-plus years since FCC v. Pacifica Foundation 1 revolutionized content-based broadcast regulation, much has changed. Although broadcast television was recognized as a dangerously pervasive medium in 1978, 2 it is no longer the dominant force that it once was, with the vast majority of Americans now paying for subscription television services like cable or satellite.
3 While the Pacifica Court strove to support parents in their struggle to protect their children from pervasive inappropriate content by upholding the Federal Communication Commission"s content regulation, 4 technological developments like the V-Chip, cable boxes, DVRs, and satellite boxes have afforded modern parents various self-help alternatives.
Many critics have argued that changes like these in the convergent media environment have obviated any need for the Supreme Court to evaluate the constitutionality of broadcast speech regulations with special deference, or so-called "intermediate scrutiny." 5 They contend that broadcast restrictions should instead be evaluated like all other content-based media regulation, with "strict scrutiny."
6 Some have suggested that no content-based television regulation could pass constitutional muster under a strict scrutiny test because new self-help media filters like the V-Chip necessarily present a less restrictive means
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THE INDECENCY OF INDECENCY 289 of controlling indecent or profane speech. 7 These arguments have found welcome ears in some courts, most notably the Second Circuit. Upon hearing Fox v. FCC on remand from the Supreme Court, the court pulled no punches in forcefully arguing that changes in the technology landscape should unravel any special First Amendment status for broadcast speech restrictions. 8 Unfortunately, both law review articles and judicial opinions that have lobbied against content-based broadcasting regulation have generally neglected to offer specific empirical evidence to support their positions. These critics tend to focus on how new technology might be used in theory rather than how it is actually used in practice. This approach is problematic. If the Supreme Court is to uproot three decades of its broadcast speech precedent (as it will have the opportunity to do when it decides the next iteration of Fox v. FCC this term), 9 it should do so on the basis of specific empirical data that directly address the status of the bedrock governmental interest from Pacifica: parental control over their children"s exposure to pervasive content. 10 Thus, it is critical to understand precisely how the changes in media consumption and technology have affected these parents and their perceptions of control. It is equally important to empirically distinguish between the efficacies of the alternatives that the Court would consider under a strict scrutiny analysis: one regime based on media filters and another based on regulation.
Without such empirical 7 Indeed, this was precisely the position taken by the Fox television stations in the Supreme Court"s most recent indecency case, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. ("Fox II"), 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009 . Brief of Respondent at 45-48, Fox II, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009 ) ("The availability of the V-Chip renders the FCC"s content-based regulation of indecent speech on broadcast television unconstitutional."). Law review articles have also advanced this argument. See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific Approach to the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245, 303 (2003) . 8 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC ("Fox III"), 613 F.3d 317, 325-27 (2d Cir. 2010) . 9 The Court agreed to hear argument specifically on the question of whether the FCC"s indecency regime is constitutional. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. ("Fox IV"), 131 S. Ct. 3065 (2011) . Oral argument occurred just before this article was printed on January 10, 2012 . No. 10-1293 : Proceedings and Orders, http://www.supremecourt .gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/10-1293 .htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2012 .
10
See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
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FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 22:287 considerations, it is impossible to accurately determine which alternative is the less restrictive method of protecting children (or whether the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has less restrictive ways of accomplishing its mandate).
This study is the first to use actual survey data to examine how technology has changed the perspectives of parents. With generous funding from the Media Management Center at Northwestern University, 11 I conducted an original survey of 575 American parents to better understand their perspectives on the intersection between television regulation and media filter technology. Parental views are fundamental to the indecency inquiry because they are at the core of the First Amendment carveout for the content-based regulation of television broadcasting. The survey results offer clear empirical support for the argument that the FCC"s content-based regulation of indecent and profane content should be deemed unconstitutional.
Broadcast television is no longer a uniquely pervasive threat to parental control over what their children watch on television. The survey data reveal that there is no statistically significant difference in perceptions of control between parents who consume only broadcast television in their homes and those who receive their television through some other means of distribution (such as cable or satellite). Moreover, there is not a statistically significant difference between these two groups of parents in their perceptions of how much exposure their children have to inappropriate content on television. In other words, the data show that parents do not perceive an underlying practical need for regulations of broadcast speech to be measured with any less scrutiny than regulations on other media. It is not a uniquely pervasive medium.
Second, parents overwhelmingly report that media filter technology like the V-chip is at least an equally effective substitute for government regulation of inappropriate content. This is a
11
The Media Management Center is Northwestern University"s media education and research entity, and is affiliated with the This paper will proceed as follows. Section I briefly summarizes content-based broadcast regulation in this country and contrasts it with how other televised content is treated under the First Amendment.
Next, Section II introduces the survey procedures. The results are presented and analyzed in Section III, with tables appended to this paper.
I. TECHNOLOGY, BROADCAST TELEVISION, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

A. The First Amendment and Broadcast Television
Congress created the FCC under the Communications Act of 1934, with a broad mandate to regulate broadcasting in the public interest.
12
Congress specifically tasked the FCC with the responsibility of imposing penalties for "obscene, indecent, or profane language." 13 However, the Act also included a provision § 1464 (2006) ("Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."). The FCC defines "indecent" content as "language or material that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory organs or activities." FCC, OBSCENE, INDECENT, AND PROFANE BROADCASTS 1, available at http://transition.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/ obscene.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2011). Profane content is "language so grossly offensive to members of the public who actually hear it as to amount to a nuisance." Id. However, it should be noted that the FCC"s definition is the subject of pending Supreme § 326 (2006) Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio communication.
Id.
15
The two clauses have generally been interpreted together to imply that the FCC may not impose prior restraint, but can issue fines for obscene, indecent, or profane speech. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 736-38 (1978 acknowledged criticism of the scarcity doctrine, 20 and while it appears to have abandoned the theory, it has not explicitly done so.
21
In 1978, the Court defined its current stance on content-based broadcast regulation in the landmark case of FCC v. Pacifica Foundation. 22 The case presented the Court with an opportunity to determine whether the FCC had the authority to regulate the broadcast of George Carlin"s "Filthy Words" monologue on the basis of indecency alone. 23 The FCC emphasized that it only intended to regulate indecent content that aired at a time when there was a "reasonable risk" that children might hear it. 24 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens upheld the Commission"s restriction of speech in this context. 25 In so doing, he presented two new rationales for why broadcast speech deserved more limited First Amendment protection than speech communicated through other mediums (namely print).
First, the Court emphasized the "uniquely pervasive presence" of broadcast media in American society. 26 The Court found the threat of invasion of privacy into the home to be compelling, especially because, practically, it was difficult for consumers to heed content warnings when they sporadically tuned in and out. 27 Second, the Court found that children were especially vulnerable to the broadcast medium because it was so readily available and could corrupt them "in an instant." 28 The Court was sympathetic to the difficulties that parents had maintaining "authority in their 20 See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376 n.11 (1984) (acknowledging "increasing criticism" of spectrum scarcity, and requesting further input from Congress or the FCC on the issue).
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 770 n.4 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the majority "refrain[ed] from relying on the notion of "spectrum scarcity"" to reach its conclusions); SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 26:22.
22
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 729-38. 23 Id. at 729.
24
Id. at 732 (quoting Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C. 2d 94, 98 (1975) harbor" period between 10:00 PM and 6:00 AM, when children are likely sleeping.
37
The Court"s Pacifica decision was steeped in the notion that the broadcast medium was unique, and deserved less First Amendment protection than other media.
38
Later cases have clearly articulated the lower degree of protection that broadcast speech receives under the First Amendment.
In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC ("Turner I"), the Court described its standard of review for content-based restrictions on broadcast speech as "less rigorous" than its standards for other media. 39 Commentators have generally described this standard as "intermediate" scrutiny. 40 The Court has stated that it will uphold a restriction on broadcast speech so long as the regulation is "narrowly tailored to further a substantial government interest," 41 a threshold that is significantly lower than the strict scrutiny inquiry used for other media.
42
B. Cable and Satellite Television
Content-based regulations on multichannel video programming distributors ("MVPDs") offering cable, fiber, and satellite television have always been treated differently than restrictions on broadcast speech. In United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, the Court drew a bright line between broadcast and cable television specifically in the context of indecency regulation.
43
Rather than revert to Pacifica"s intermediate scrutiny test, the Court applied a strict scrutiny standard to determine whether sexually-oriented cable channels could constitutionally be required to scramble their transmissions or limit transmission to hours when children would not be watching (10 PM to 6 AM). 44 Under a strict scrutiny analysis, the government must show that its regulation is the "least restrictive means" of "promot[ing] a compelling Government interest." 45 In making its strict scrutiny assessment, the Playboy Court repeatedly emphasized that media filtering technology associated with cable could achieve the government"s compelling interest of helping parents keep inappropriate content from their children.
46
The "key difference" between cable and broadcast television in the case was that "[c]able systems have the capacity to block unwanted channels on a household-by-household basis." 47 The Court ruled that such technology was critically important to its First Amendment inquiry because it could support parents while still allowing willing consumers to partake in the speech that they desired to receive. 48 It summarily concluded that "targeted blocking is less restrictive than banning," 49 and deemed the scrambling restriction unconstitutional. Id. at 815.
47
Id. It is worth noting that the Court has offered slightly different rationales for distinguishing cable in the content-neutral context. In Turner I, a case that dealt with the Cable Act"s content-neutral must-carry provision, the Court focused on the "inherent limitations that characterize the broadcast medium," harkening back to the original scarcity justification for regulating broadcast speech. 512 U. S. 622, 638-39 (1994) . The Court distinguished that there were no significant limits on the number of cable channels, and no threat of signal interference. Id. at 639.
48
United States v. Playboy Entm"t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000) ("[T] argeted blocking enables the Government to support parental authority without affecting the First Amendment interests of speakers and willing listeners-listeners for whom, if the speech is unpopular or indecent, the privacy of their own homes may be the optimal place of receipt.").
49
Id. This very statement is now being used by some commentators to challenge whether any content-based regulation on broadcast television is permissible. See infra Section II.C.
50
Id. at 827.
51
Id. at 814 (" [T] he mere possibility that user-based Internet screening software would "soon be widely available" was relevant to our rejection of an overbroad restriction of indecent cyberspeech." (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 876-77 (1997))).
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heard an indecency case regarding either satellite or fiber-delivered television, it is reasonable to expect that they would also receive strict scrutiny treatment because they offer similar filtering capabilities. 52 Although the FCC has not traditionally attempted to enforce the Telecommunications Act indecency regulations against MPVDs (including cable), 53 the issue is not entirely moot because Congress could simply legislate content-based restrictions on those services as well. Indeed, there was a significant push to do so as recently as 2005 (in the wake of the Janet Jackson imbroglio).
54
Of course, any such attempt would surely receive a prompt challenge in court, and the government would be required to show that the regulation was the least restrictive means of achieving its compelling interest. Perhaps the most significant development, at least insofar as the First Amendment is concerned, is one that is now over ten years old. Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress mandated that all televisions larger than thirteen inches sold after January 1, 2000 must include a V-chip. 56 The V-chip technology works with TV ratings in a manner that allows parents to block shows that they disfavor (based on the shows" ratings). 57 Nevertheless, while a V-chip is available in the vast majority of televisions currently in use, only a very small number of consumers actually utilize the technology. One 2007 study found that while over eighty-two percent (82%) of parents had a V-chipequipped television, more than half weren"t even aware their TVs actually included V-chips, and only sixteen percent (16%) had ever actually used one.
C. The Emerging
58
Other important changes have also occurred in the media environment. First, the percentage of families that use broadcast signals for their television has plummeted. Fewer than ten percent (10%) of families rely on broadcast transmissions for their television. 59 Instead, the vast majority of consumers now receive their television transmissions via MVPDs like cable and satellite. Second, American children are now exposed to a wide range of media that extend well beyond just broadcast television. One recent study found that children ages eight to eighteen spend more than seven and a half hours per day consuming media, during which time they take in a whopping ten hours and forty-five minutes worth of content (through multitasking). 64 While video is still the largest portion of their media consumption (four hours and twenty-nine minutes per day), more than forty percent (40%) of that video content is not traditional television; it "is either prerecorded or watched on such other platforms as computers, DVDs, cell phones, or iPods." 65 Some prominent judicial opinions have explicitly suggested that because of these changes in technology and media consumption, broadcast regulations no longer merit special First Amendment treatment. This position was recently advanced by Justice Thomas in his concurring opinion in Fox v. FCC, 66 and even more forcefully asserted by the Second Circuit when it heard the same case on remand.
67
The case dealt with the FCC"s punishment of "fleeting expletives," or unscripted profanity that is transmitted during live broadcasts. GUIDELINES, http://www.tvguidelines.org/parentalcontrols.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2011) (offering similar information). 62 47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(2) (2006) ("In order to restrict the viewing of programming which is obscene or indecent, upon the request of a subscriber, a cable operator shall provide (by sale or lease) a device by which the subscriber can prohibit viewing of a particular cable service during periods selected by that subscriber."). He specifically took aim at both the scarcity and pervasiveness justifications, writing that the broadcast spectrum was no longer scarce, and that broadcast television was no longer uniquely pervasive since it had become just a small component of a multifaceted media landscape.
72
On remand, the Second Circuit took the baton from Justice Thomas, pausing for a lengthy tangent to question whether the Supreme Court"s longstanding Pacifica doctrine should still be valid.
73
The court specifically highlighted the advent of new 68 The majority ruled that the FCC"s decision to begin treating fleeting expletives as actionable under its indecency policy was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Criticism regarding the lack of synthesis between modern technology and the Court"s broadcast speech doctrine has not been confined to judicial opinions. Several articles have similarly contested that the nation"s broadcast policy is woefully behind the times, and that the advent of the Internet and digital media filters should allow broadcast speech to be deregulated. These arguments can be separated into two distinct camps. Some critics argue, as did Justice Thomas and the Second Circuit, that broadcast regulations should no longer be weighed with special intermediate scrutiny, but instead deserve treatment under the more rigid strict scrutiny test.
78 Others go one step further, contending that the proliferation of media filters like the V-chip inherently presents a less restrictive means of protecting children from indecent content. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 30, at 1155 (suggesting that because the V-chip gives parents the ability to "protect" their children from unwanted television, "the government should henceforth be forbidden from engaging in other content-based regulation of Surprisingly, there is little empirical data to support these conclusions. 80 Both Justice Thomas and the Second Circuit spoke of technological change in general terms, but did not offer any specific evidence about how those changes actually impacted the control that parents had over indecent content, especially the minority of parents who choose to have only broadcast television in their homes. In order to properly determine if the Court should continue to recognize broadcast television as a unique medium, there must be some empirical consideration of how parents with broadcast television feel about their level of control relative to other parents.
Similarly, there should be an empirical consideration of self-help technology alternatives like the V-chip in order to make a decision about less restrictive methods of achieving the government"s compelling interest under the strict scrutiny test.
At first blush, language from the Playboy decision seems to suggest that the courts should not be concerned with how self-help media filters are actually adopted or used for strict scrutiny analysis. In identifying cable boxes as a less restrictive means to control signal bleed from indecent programming, the Court stated, It is no response that voluntary blocking requires a consumer to take action, or may be inconvenient, or may not go perfectly every time. A court should not assume a plausible, less restrictive alternative violence and indecency in the broadcast media"); Yoo, supra note 7, at 305 (arguing that "the V-chip constitutes a less restrictive means sufficient to render any ban on indecent speech unconstitutional"); Elizabeth H. This striking passage has not gone unnoticed and has been cited in subsequent decisions and law review articles arguing that self-help media filters must be recognized as a less restrictive means of controlling indecent content. 82 However, a more careful analysis shows why it is wrong to interpret the Playboy decision to mean that the mere existence of any media filters presents a de facto bar against government media indecency regulation; empirical data must be considered if it is available.
To start, it is clear that the Playboy Court was willing to examine data in order to determine whether blocking technology could be construed as a "plausible" or "effective" alternative to regulation.
83
The Court"s statement that it would not make assumptions about consumer behavior was largely driven by the fact that the government failed to provide it with any comparative evidence that went beyond mere "anecdote and supposition." 84 The Court lamented that "[t]he record [was] silent as to the comparative effectiveness of the two alternatives." 85 Under the strict scrutiny standard, the government had a burden to show that its regulation was a less restrictive means of achieving the compelling interest of protecting children, a burden that it failed to meet.
86 But its failure should by no means be construed to imply that it did not have the ability to present evidence about the extent 81 United States v. Playboy Entm"t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 824 (2000) . 82 See, e.g., Fox I, 489 F.3d 444, 465-66 (2d Cir. 2007 to which the alternatives were more or less restrictive, or more or less effective at achieving the compelling interest at stake. It did.
Other recent cases similarly support the conclusion that the Court should rely heavily upon empirical evidence when evaluating the constitutionality of speech regulations. A comparison to the Court"s treatment of must-carry restrictions in Turner I 87 and Turner II 88 is illustrative. In Turner I, the Court determined that the record was insufficient for it to make a proper assessment of whether must-carry provisions were constitutional under intermediate scrutiny. 89 It therefore remanded the case to the District Court for the District of Columbia for additional factfinding. 90 With more data to consider in Turner II, the Court reviewed the expanded record to determine "whether the mustcarry provisions were designed to address a real harm, and whether those provisions [would] REV. 2312 REV. , 2319 REV. (1998 . To the extent that Congress has provided specific interpretations of data in support of content-neutral regulations, the Court will frequently heed those interpretations. See Turner II, 520 U.S. at 224 ("We cannot displace Congress" judgment respecting content-neutral regulations with our own, so long as its policy is grounded on reasonable factual findings supported by evidence that is substantial for a legislative determination."). Justice Breyer expounded upon this point in his recent Brown dissent, arguing that the Court has a history of deferring to the factual findings of the legislature, and contending that the
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Finally, it should be a matter of common sense that courts would be willing to evaluate data regarding competing alternatives under a strict scrutiny assessment. It would be illogical to ignore reliable data that could help to make a more informed comparison between technology and the regulation it might supplant, 93 at least when such data is available.
94
After all, there are scores of conceivable reasons why a media filter might not be deemed an effective alternative to regulation: it might be inordinately complex to use, prohibitively expensive to procure, or obscure and unavailable for widespread use. The point is that any honest analysis of the extent to which new technology can be an adequate substitute for content regulation must consider data about its adoption and efficacy in practice.
II. METHODS
In early 2011, I delivered an online survey to a random sample of 575 parents who had children under the age of eighteen living at home. The survey included questions on a range of topics related to technology and media regulation. Parents are the most appropriate survey target for this kind of analysis because they are the population that Pacifica aimed to assist; the government interest at stake deals directly with facilitating parental control over their children"s exposure to indecent media.
95
The Court should have done so in the case of regulations regarding violent video games. Brown v. Entm"t Merchs. Ass"n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2770 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). But his was the minority view in that case. The majority decision tilted in the other direction, suggesting that the Court will instead make its own independent assessment of the data. Id. at 2738-39 (discussing the shortcomings of California"s factual showing regarding video game violence).
93
See Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (1998) (arguing that the Court"s constitutional jurisprudence would be more aligned with reality if there were closer attention paid "to the likely consequences of its decisions and to the empirical assumptions underlying its doctrines").
94
See Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 21 (1998) (describing "the lack of an empirical footing" as the "Achilles heel of constitutional law," but noting that in some cases, "ignorance is irremediable").
95
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U. S. 726, 749-50 (1978) (underscoring the government"s interest "in the "well-being of its youth" and in supporting "parents" claim to authority in their own household"") (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637-41 (1968) government has no interest in regulating indecent content that parents want their children to see. 96 Thus, parents are the frontline arbiters and are best able to gauge how pervasive television content is to children in modern American homes, and whether self-help technology like media filters is an effective solution to keep this unwanted indecent content at bay.
Although the sample was random, whites were overrepresented in the respondent population. Eighty-two percent (82%) of respondents identified as white. Because there was a statistically significant relationship between race and perspectives on media regulation for some questions, I weighted the data to reflect a more representative racial distribution.
97
I then analyzed the data, frequently employing the Pearson Chi Square test. This test is one of the most common methods of statistical analysis used to evaluate the probability that the connection between two categorical variables is due to an actual relationship and not the product of random chance. 98 The survey had a margin of error of plus or minus four percent (+/-4%).
99
importance of parental control in justifying content-based regulation for broadcast media).
96
United States v. Playboy Entm"t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811 (2000) (noting that "the Government disclaims any interest in preventing children from seeing or hearing [Playboy"s programming] with the consent of their parents").
97
The data were weighted so that the racial breakdown was sixty-five percent (65%) white and thirty-five percent (35%) non-white, consistent with the most recent Census data available. U.S. Census Bureau, B03002. Hispanic or Latino Origin by Race, 2009 American Community Survey, CENSUS.GOV, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ TTable?_bm=y&-ds_name=ACS_ 2009_1YR_G00_&-_geoSkip=0&-CONTEXT=dt&-mt_name=ACS_2009_1YR_G2000_C03002&-redoLog=false&-_skip=0&-geo_id=010 00US&-_showChild=Y&-format=&-_lang=en&_toggle=ACS_2009_1YR_G2000_C030 02 (last visited Nov. 15, 2011) . This weighting had a marked effect on the political affiliation of the respondents. Although the survey originally yielded twenty-nine percent (29%) Republican, twenty-nine percent (29%) Democrat, and twenty-three percent (23%) Independent, after the racial weighting, the breakdown shifted to twenty-five percent (25%) Republican, thirty-five percent (35%) Democrat, and twenty-two percent (22%) Independent. As with all studies, the margin of error fluctuates with each specific question, especially those that were only answered by a subset of the total sample.
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The numbers that follow in Part IV generally are percentages of valid responses only, excluding responses such as "don"t know" and "prefer not to answer." 100
III. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A. Should Restrictions on Broadcast Speech be Subject to Strict Scrutiny?
The first important question to answer is whether broadcast television is still the unique medium it was in 1978 when the Court decided Pacifica. The empirical answer appears to be that it is not. Several different metrics from this study suggest that broadcast should no longer be singled out for its privileged degree of intermediate scrutiny.
First, there was no statistically significant relationship between television delivery type and parental satisfaction with control over unwanted television content. 101 In other words, parents do not seem to think that broadcast television is a uniquely pervasive medium, relative to other delivery channels (cable, satellite, or fiber). There was only an eight percent (8%) difference in satisfaction with control between parents who received their television signal only via broadcast ("broadcast parents"), 102 and those who received it via other means ("non-broadcast parents"); seventy-seven percent (77%) and eighty-five percent (85%) were Thus, the study suggests that the perception of parental control is nearly identical between parents whose children watch programming that is regulated by the FCC and those whose children watch programming that is not. 104 Second, there was no statistically significant relationship between television delivery type and parental concerns about inappropriate content exposure. Broadcast parents did not have significantly unique concerns about the amount of adult language, sexual content, or violent content to which their children were exposed on television, whether taken individually or grouped together as "inappropriate content."
105 In fact, the differences in ratings were so small that the results for some of these comparisons were about as statistically insignificant as can possibly be calculated.
106
Furthermore, these parental feelings were not merely similar across television delivery alternatives; the percentages of concerned parents from my study were comparable 103 See infra Table 1 . On the other hand, there was a statistically significant relationship between television delivery type and parental satisfaction with the government"s regulation of unwanted programming. Parents who received broadcast only were much more likely to be dissatisfied with the government"s regulation of television programming. However, it would be inappropriate to answer the First Amendment question based on opinions regarding regulatory satisfaction; that would be akin to putting the cart before the horse. The Pacifica logic is based upon notions of parental control, so responses regarding their perceptions of control should be determinative here. 104 The FCC currently only imposes content-based fines on broadcasters. FCC, Regulation, supra note 52 ("With respect to cable and satellite services, Congress has charged the Commission with enforcing the statutory prohibition against airing indecent programming "by means of radio communications." The Commission has historically interpreted this restriction to apply to radio and television broadcasters, and has never extended it to cover cable operators. In addition, because cable and satellite services are subscription-based, viewers of these services have greater control over the programming content that comes into their homes, whereas broadcast content traditionally has been available to any member of the public with a radio or television."). 105 See infra Table 2 . Overall, seventy-eight percent (78%) of parents were concerned or very concerned about exposure to violent content, eighty-one percent (81%) about exposure to sexual content, and seventy-three percent (73%) about exposure to adult language. 106 See infra Table 2 . For instance, the Fisher"s Exact test result for violent content was 0.999999999999786, implying that there is only a 0.0000000000324% chance that the data support a finding of a relationship between television delivery and concerns about television exposure to violence.
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107
Thus, while the FCC continues to impose fines on broadcasters under the guise that the medium is pervasive and is uniquely accessible to children, the statistics suggest that broadcast television has truly become a homogenous part of the media landscape. The longstanding Pacifica principle that broadcasting is different lacks any significant empirical support among parents in this study. Therefore, if the Supreme Court were to hear a challenge to content-based restrictions on broadcast television, it should close the book on Pacifica and its special intermediate scrutiny carve-out, and apply a traditional strict scrutiny test instead.
B. Are Media Filters like the V-chip a Less Restrictive Means of Achieving the Government's Interests in Regulating Broadcast Speech?
Having established that regulations on broadcast television should be evaluated using strict scrutiny, the logical next question is whether the proliferation of media filters like the V-chip presents a less restrictive means than regulation to protect children from indecent or profane television content. The empirical answer from this study is a nuanced yes. While parents would generally prefer to have both media filters and government regulation, they admit that the filters are just as effective as regulation by itself. Therefore, if asked to apply a strict scrutiny test, the Court should rule that it is unconstitutional for the FCC to continue to regulate either indecency or profanity on television.
As a preliminary matter, the data support earlier findings that the V-chip suffers from inadequate public awareness and adoption.
108
Only fifty-nine percent (59%) of respondents had heard of the V-chip before taking this survey. While eighty-six 107 See RIDEOUT, supra note 58, at 24 (reporting that eighty percent (80%) of parents were somewhat concerned or very concerned about exposure to violent content, seventyseven percent (77%) about sexual content, and seventy-seven percent (77%) about adult language). MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 22:287 percent (86%) of respondents had purchased a TV since January 1, 2000 (when the V-chip rule went into effect), only thirty-eight percent (38%) of them knew that their TV had a V-chip, and only 15% of them reported that their family had ever actually used the V-chip. These figures are especially striking considering that when the device was first conceived, seventy-two percent (72%) of Americans said they would use a V-chip "often" or "once in awhile" if they had the technology. 109 Comparing these numbers to those from Kaiser"s 2007 study, it seems that general awareness of the V-chip has decreased (from seventy percent (70%) to fiftynine percent (59%)), although the usage percentages are still approximately the same among those with equipped televisions.
110
Those who actually use their V-chip technology are quite content; ninety-eight percent (98%) of respondents who had used a V-chip said it was either "somewhat useful" or "very useful" in helping them filter inappropriate content from their children.
111 But the overarching problem remains: with the majority of Americans unaware that their TVs have V-chip technology, it is a stretch to believe that the V-chip alone is a realistic alternative to regulation.
However, the V-chip does not exist in a vacuum, and many other media filters have sprung up in its wake. More than sixtythree percent (63%) of the survey respondents reported that they had some other filtering device that they could use to block unwanted programming (whether a cable box, DVR, satellite box, or something else).
112
In contrast to the V-chip"s poor usage, seventy-one percent (71%) of cable box owners had used their devices, along with seventy-seven percent (77%) of DVR owners, sixty-three percent (63%) of satellite box owners, and thirty-four 109 JEFFREY D. STANGER & NATALIA GRIDINA, ANNENBERG PUBLIC POLICY CENTER, MEDIA IN THE HOME 1999: THE FOURTH ANNUAL SURVEY OF PARENTS AND CHILDREN 24 (1999) . 110 See RIDEOUT, supra note 58, at 19; infra Table 3 . It appears as though V-chip awareness may have peaked in 2007. This is likely attributable at least in part to growth of media filter alternatives (such as DVRs). 111 See infra, Table 4 . 112 This figure does not include another ten percent (10%) of respondents who were not sure. Excluding those respondents, over seventy-three percent (73%) said they had another filtering device. FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 22:287 regulation. The parents that Pacifica strove to assist seem to think that its regulatory progeny is less effective than less-restrictive self-help media filter alternatives.
The strong response to this question is especially noteworthy when considered in light of prior research that has shown that a significant majority of adults believe that parents, rather than the federal government, should be primarily responsible for screening inappropriate content from their children.
118 It appears that parents now have the technological capability, and the resulting burden, to do so.
119
Some may find this answer to be incongruent with the proregulation survey responses discussed above. On one hand, most parents say that they want continued content-based government regulation of broadcast television, 120 in spite of new media filter technology. On the other hand, the vast majority of parents say that the new technologies are at least as effective as government regulation.
121 This tension is reflective of the extent to which majoritarian parental perspectives stand at odds with the minorityprotective First Amendment strict scrutiny test. While parents may have an "any means necessary" mentality when it comes to protecting their children from objectionable content, that position is incongruent with the "least restrictive means" standard used by the Supreme Court. Put another way, content-based restrictions could always inch cumulatively closer towards fulfilling a compelling government goal, but the Supreme Court"s First Amendment strict scrutiny test imposes a limit. GOVERNMENT INTRUSIVENESS 2 (Apr. 19, 2005) , http://people-press.org/ reports/pdf/241.pdf. The margin in this particular study was about twenty-to-one. 119 Bell, supra note 81, at 778 (noting that "each time that courts . . . limit state action, they impose on each of us the responsibility for adopting the new and improved self-help technologies that render such state action obsolete"). 120 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 121 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
2012] THE INDECENCY OF INDECENCY 313
The purpose of the test is to ensure that speech is restricted no further than necessary to achieve the goal, for it is important to ensure that legitimate speech is not chilled or punished. For that reason, the test does not begin with the status quo of existing regulations, then ask whether the challenged restriction has some additional ability to achieve Congress" legitimate interest. Any restriction on speech could be justified under that analysis. Instead, the court should ask whether the challenged regulation is the least restrictive means among available, effective alternatives.
122
Because parents recognize that media filters like the V-Chip are a more effective method of controlling objectionable television content, and because the V-Chip and other media filters are now widely available, the regulatory alternative of content-based penalties should be considered unconstitutional.
C. Improving Media Filters
In looking for a more robust understanding of parental perspectives on technology and media regulation, one concept to consider is what I term "consumer transparency." The television filters and regulations that are most successful are those that are obvious or transparent to consumers through their ordinary TV consumption. The media filters and regulations that are less obvious appear to be less helpful.
123
The consumer transparency hypothesis can offer insight into several different aspects of this survey. For instance, a significant majority of respondents were familiar with the national TV rating system. About seventy-eight percent (78%) thought that the ratings were a good idea. This could be because the ratings have a high degree of consumer transparency because they appear at the start of every TV show. In contrast, there is less consumer FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 22:287 transparency about who actually sets the ratings; only forty-four percent (44%) of the survey respondents correctly answered that the television industry bears that responsibility. This regulatory ambivalence (or apathy) was also evident in some questions asking for perspectives about regulation.
Throughout the study, significantly more respondents answered "don"t know" to questions about regulation than to those about respondent behavior or perceptions of control.
The consumer transparency hypothesis extends to devices as well. In spite of the fact that the V-chip is the most widelydistributed media filter (included in virtually every television on the market since 2000), 124 it is far from being the most wellknown. Significantly more parents were familiar with media filter devices that are required for ordinary operation of a television (such as a cable box) than the less-obvious V-chip that has continued to remain shrouded from consumers.
The hypothesis can also help to explain consumer responses regarding the intricacies and regulation of television delivery systems. For example, the differences between the broadcast and cable viewing experiences are largely imperceptible.
125 Although the Playboy Court distinguished between delivery systems by noting that cable companies can filter their signals on a householdby-household basis, 126 that difference is not obvious to the viewer. Nearly twenty-five percent (25%) of cable customers in the survey did not know that they could request that a channel to be cut off by their service provider. Furthermore, most cable customers have no input on the basic set of channels they receive due to the cable industry"s tiered pricing structure. The lack of a transparent difference between delivery systems could be one reason why 124 fifty-three percent (53%) of the parents responded that the government should regulate broadcast and cable in the same way, 127 and why there were no substantive differences across delivery systems in parental perception of unwanted content.
128
On a basic level, television consumption is largely homogenous across delivery systems.
If the FCC"s content-based regulations are ultimately deemed unconstitutional, there will likely be an even stronger private demand for media filters. Parents want to take control of filtering, and are concerned about the amount of exposure that their children have to undesirable content. The most effective media filters will likely be the ones that are conspicuous within normal consumer television use. Similarly, consumers will be more likely to understand regulations that are based on principles of consumer transparency.
CONCLUSION
When the Supreme Court has the opportunity to re-evaluate content-based broadcast regulation, the justices should turn to empirical evidence to help answer two critical First Amendment questions. First, is broadcast television still so uniquely pervasive that parents lack control over the content that their children watch? The results from this study strongly suggest that it is not; parents in broadcast households do not have significantly different perceptions of control than parents in households with MPVD services. Therefore, the age of Pacifica is over, and intermediate scrutiny should be abandoned in the broadcast context. Second, are media filters an effective, less restrictive means of helping these parents control inappropriate content on television from reaching their children? The data show that parents overwhelmingly believe media filter technology is an effective alternative to government regulation. And self-help technology is 316 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 22:287 clearly less restrictive on speech than content-based broadcast regulation. Therefore, indecency regulation cannot stand up to a strict scrutiny test.
One important lesson to take from this analysis is that empirical studies can offer critical insights about the propriety of media regulation. To that end, there are many avenues for future study. It would be useful to perform a mixed-mode survey to build upon these results, and protect against the inherent kinds of bias that are included with any kind of single-medium study (in this case, the Internet). Given that the number of broadcast-only households is dwindling, it could also be appropriate to do a more focused study that would target that population specifically. Such studies could help the Court achieve a more robust understanding of real-world implications when balancing the efficacy of government speech interests against self-help technology.
APPENDIX
A. Table 1 -Satisfaction with Control Over Unwanted Content
Question: How satisfied are you with your ability to control your children"s access to TV programming that you don"t want your children to watch? 
